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Advocates of dialogic communication have promoted two-way 
symmetrical communication as the most effective and ethical model for public 
relations. This article uses John Durham Peters’s critique of dialogic 
communication to reconsider this infatuation with dialogue. In this article, we 
argue that dialogue’s potential for selectivity and tyranny poses moral 
problems for public relations. Dialogue’s emphasis on reciprocal 
communication also saddles public relations with ethically questionable quid 
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pro quo relationships. We contend that dissemination can be more just than 
dialogue because it demands more integrity of the source and recognizes the 
freedom and individuality of the source. The type of communication, such as 
dialogue or dissemination, is less important than the mutual discovery of 
truth. Reconciliation, a new model of public relations, is proposed as an 
alternative to pure dialogue. Reconciliation recognizes and values individuality 
and differences, and integrity is no longer sacrificed at the altar of agreement. 
Communication: Both “Bridge and Chasm” 
When WellPoint, a California-based holding company, acquired 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia, it soon learned that the two 
companies were as far apart culturally as they were geographically. 
The buyer’s communications team discovered that Blue Cross had 
never undergone reorganization while WellPoint reorganized on a 
regular basis. “I didn’t get the cultural issue until I was there,” said 
Ken Ferber, WellPoint’s vice president of communications. “I came 
back to my boss and said, ‘We’re not ready’” (Communicating 
Corporate Change, 2001, p. 1). 
Typical public relations strategy called for Ferber to initiate a 
“two-way concept” of public relations that “emphasizes communication 
exchange, reciprocity, and mutual understanding” (Cutlip, Center, & 
Broom, 2000, p. 4). Using two-way communication, Wellpoint and Blue 
Cross could adjust and adapt to each other until they reached a 
consensus or an agreement on a common culture. This approach is 
rooted in open systems theory and is best known in public relations 
literature as the two-way symmetrical model of public relations 
(Grunig & Hunt, 1984). The two-way symmetrical model is considered 
the most ethical (Grunig, 1989; Pearson, 1989) because one-way 
“public relations relies almost entirely on propaganda and persuasive 
communication” (Cutlip et al., 2000, p. 3). However, how realistic is it 
for two companies with distinct corporate cultures to achieve a 
symmetrical relationship, especially when a big company acquires a 
smaller one? The merger’s success may depend on the two companies 
recognizing their differences rather than seeking agreement on a 
common culture. Recognizing differences takes into consideration 
human nature, that people may associate with a particular company 
because its culture fits their personalities. As philosopher William 
James (1890/1952) said, each person may divide the universe into 
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two separate halves and associate with one or the other but no matter 
which one a person chooses, each draws a dividing line in a different 
place: 
The altogether unique kind of interest each human mind feels in 
those parts of creation which it can call me or mine may be a 
moral riddle, but it is a fundamental psychological fact. … Each 
of us dichotomizes the Kosmos in a different place. (as cited 
Peters, 1999, p. 4) 
Individual distinctions, let alone group differences, make the 
symmetry of dialogic communication an elusive goal. Although many 
communication theorists would like to believe that true communication 
means reaching agreement or achieving an understanding, the reality 
is that communication is both a “bridge and chasm,” bringing people 
closer to agreement and exposing the disagreement lying in between 
(Peters, 1999, p. 5). Peters defined communication as the project of 
reconciling self and other. To think it might do more may be a recipe 
for failure. 
Peters (1999) defended his contentions in his book Speaking 
Into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication. Although Peters 
did not address public relations in his book, he did raise important 
questions about whether dialogue is always the best approach to 
communication. Indeed, Peters’s work has the potential of liberating 
public relations from an unhealthy infatuation with dialogue and its 
antecedents, such as symmetrical and reciprocal communication. This 
is not to say that dialogue is always bad or that it can never be ethical. 
On the contrary, Peters saw dialogue as lofty goal for communication; 
he just worried that it “may blind us to the more subtle splendors of 
dissemination or suspended dialogue” (p. 62). There is value in 
nonreciprocal forms of communication. 
In this article, we attempt to apply Peters’s (1999) critique of 
dialogue to public relations. We question the basic assumptions of 
dialogic public relations by examining the philosophical roots of 
dialogue and two-way symmetric communication. This deconstruction 
of dialogue exposes moral cracks and contradictions in the concept and 
its application to public relations. 
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Second, in this article we show how dialogue’s emphasis on 
reciprocal communication saddles public relations with ethically 
questionable quid pro quo relationships. Third, a look at Peters’s 
analysis of dissemination shows that contrary to dialogue, 
dissemination can enhance freedom, responsibility, diversity, and 
reconciliation. Finally, we introduce reconciliation as a new model of 
ethical public relations that recognizes the strengths and limitations of 
dialogue and dissemination. 
Dialogue in Public Relations 
In recent years, the business world has embraced dialogue as 
the role model for effective, ethical communication. 
In certain quarters dialogue has attained something of a holy 
status. It is held up as the summit of human encounter, the 
essence of liberal education, and the medium of participatory 
democracy. By virtue of its reciprocity and interaction, dialogue 
is taken as superior to the one-way communiqués of mass 
media and mass culture. (Peters, 1999, p. 33) 
Public relations research and theory is no exception to this rule. 
If one accepts the conclusions of post-modern rhetorical 
theory—that communication processes play a fundamental role 
in the generation of both scientific and moral truth—then ethical 
business conduct is conduct that is sanctioned within the 
parameters of a dialogic communication process … No other 
source of ethical standards exists. Conduct that is not 
sanctioned or legitimized by that process is open to attack on 
moral grounds. (Pearson, 1989, p. 127) 
The argument that dialogue should become the central focus for 
business ethics has become a common theme for public relations 
scholars. In their groundbreaking work, Grunig and Hunt (1984) 
identified four models of public relations: press agentry or publicity, 
public information, two-way asymmetrical, and two-way symmetrical. 
Grunig (1989) praised two-way symmetrical as the most “excellent” of 
the models and labeled press agentry or publicity as “propagandistic 
public relations,” public information as “journalists-in-residence” 
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dissemination absent of any negative information, and two-way 
asymmetrical communication as manipulating publics to accomplish 
organizational goals (p. 29). 
In subsequent research, Grunig (1989) touted the two-way 
symmetrical model as the most ethical, arguing that its ethical 
rationale came from the Habermas (1984) ideal speech situation 
(Grunig & Grunig, 1992; Pearson 1989). The ideal speech situation 
emphasizes symmetry and reciprocity, conditions that mirror the two-
way symmetrical model (Leeper, 1996). Like Habermas, Grunig 
defined communication as a process that leads to mutual 
understanding. “The major purpose of communication is to facilitate 
understanding among people and such other systems as organizations, 
publics, or societies,” Grunig wrote. “Persuasion of one person by 
another is less desirable” (Grunig, 1989, p. 38). In 2001, Grunig 
moderated his views to some extent, contending that the symmetrical 
model was “inherently ethical,” whereas the other models were ethical, 
“depending on the rules used to ensure ethical practice” (p. 29). 
Despite Grunig’s (1989) attempts to clarify his views, the model 
became the target of criticism by scholars. Pieczka (1997) claimed the 
two-way symmetrical model is utopian, whereas Van der Meiden 
(1993) argued that such communication is unrealistic for organizations 
because it requires them to give up goals and objectives vital for 
survival in the business world. Others said Grunig’s model fails to 
consider how organizations use a combination of the four models in 
public relations (Leichty & Springston, 1993). Susskind and Field 
(1996) noted the difficulty of using the two-way symmetrical model in 
times of conflict: “In value-laden debates, to compromise or to 
accommodate neither advances one’s self-interest nor increases joint 
gain” (p. 155). 
Cancel, Mitrook, and Cameron (1999) wondered how an 
organization would deal with morally repugnant publics, especially in 
situations in which the organization starts from a position based on 
morally defensible deontological principles. The authors also 
questioned whether accommodation is logically possible when adapting 
to one public is done at the expense of another. They proposed a 
contingency theory of accommodation that attempts to balance 
intended effects between the client and the public interest. Their 
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theory offers a possible alternative to dialogue, but in the end it still 
emphasizes the importance of dialogue over dissemination. 
For others, “dialogue is not a panacea. A dialogic approach 
cannot force an organization to behave ethically, nor is it even 
appropriate in some circumstances” (Kent & Taylor, 2002, p. 24). The 
term dialogue, Kent and Taylor added, is used ubiquitously and with 
little specificity. What is understandable is dialogue’s appeal to public 
relations. In a profession beset by criticism for spinning the truth to 
portray bad news as good and good news as better than it is, public 
relations embraced dialogue’s emphasis on equality, agreement, and 
mutual benefit. However, Peters’s (1999) historical analysis showed 
that dialogue is not always the balanced, fair approach that it appears 
to be. Peters argued that “dialogue can be tyrannical and 
dissemination can be just”(p. 34). 
The Debate: Dialogue Versus Dissemination 
In support of his argument, Peters (1999) staged a debate 
between Socrates, dialogue’s greatest proponent, and Jesus, the 
world’s “most enduring voice for dissemination” (p. 35). The Phaedrus, 
Peters claimed, reflects an anxiety over technology’s effects on human 
interaction. For Socrates, the technology was writing, but it could 
easily represent the concerns for the dispersion of information across 
radio, television, and the Internet. Socrates saw true communication 
as a “matching of minds,” a “coupling of desires.” In face-to-face 
speech two people share an event intended for only each other, but 
“writing allows all manner of strange couplings: the distant influence 
the near, the dead speak to the living, and the many read what was 
intended for the few” (Peters, 1999, p. 37). 
Peters (1999) described Socrates’s vision of communication as a 
reciprocal love without penetration, a love of wisdom pursued with 
another human. This is the love of the noble lover who fixes “his 
attention upon the intelligible and the divine,” conceiving “an exalted 
attitude toward the beloved” (Weaver, 1985, p. 13). In the Phaedrus, 
Socrates called this type of communication a “blessed life and a life of 
one mind … , being masters of themselves and orderly, enslaved in 
regard to that by which the soul’s badness was arising within, freed in 
regard to that by which virtue was arising” (Plato, 1998, p. 61 [256a–
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256b]). Genuine love and friendship emerges from this symmetrical 
relationship. “Socrates treats interpersonal communication as not only 
a happy mode of message exchange but, at its finest, the mutual 
salvation of souls in each other’s love beneath the blessings of 
heaven” (Peters, 1999, p. 45). This ideal of communication is 
“glorious” in its romantic notion of the melding of souls and “severe” in 
its unrealistic expectations for successful communication (Peters, 
1999, p. 45). Peters echoes concerns of many public relations scholars 
who believe symmetrical communication is an unattainable normative 
theory for the practice of public relations. 
For Socrates, true love is not dispersed indiscriminately but only 
shared with a deserving soul who is willing to reciprocate. The effect of 
this type of communication, whether between lovers in dialogue or the 
“reciprocal coupling” between speaker and audience in rhetoric, is a 
“closed communication circuit” (Peters, 1999, p. 46). Instead of 
promoting the open communication valued by public relations, 
dialogue emphasizes limited participation in the process and 
heightened control over the interchange. 
Writing may provide more participation and freedom, but its 
“dispersive properties” allow it to fall into any hands, producing 
progeny (interpretations) much different than that intended by the 
message’s parent. To expand on the Socratic analogy, the writer’s 
promiscuity could lead to the creation of many illegitimate children 
who may look like the original but grow to maturity under the 
influence of strangers. “For Socrates,” wrote Peters (1999), “as for 
many thinkers since, dialogue (fertile coupling) is the norm; 
dissemination (spilled seed) is the deviation” (p. 49). In writing, as in 
broadcasting, personal contact is replaced by the illusion of presence. 
There is no chance for interaction and mutual understanding. The 
receiver is left to his or her own devices to interpret the soul of the 
sender. 
Socrates’s vision of communication, again, is not simply about 
media—the goodness of speech versus the badness of writing—
but about the symmetry and tightness of the relationships in 
which they are embedded. For Plato’s Socrates, the medium is 
not a mere channel but a whole series of relationships. The 
critique of writing on papyrus as opposed to writing on souls 
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maintains the deeper theme of dialogue: two are needed for 
love or wisdom. (Peters, 1999, pp. 49–50, italics added). 
Socrates wanted mutual discovery, understanding, and 
agreement, but its reliance on reciprocity threatens to reduce society 
to quid pro quo relationships. “Social life,” Peters (1999) contended, 
“would be a cycle of payment, rather than gifts” (p. 56). Dialogue also 
emphasizes selectivity and controlled interpersonal communication, 
both which can lead to tyranny, seduction, pandering, and missed 
connections. 
As an alternative to dialogue, Peters (1999) offered the synoptic 
Gospels’ celebration of dissemination. In the parable of the sower, 
Jesus talks about uniformly broadcasting seeds across various types of 
soil. The harvest is varied depending upon the receptiveness of the 
receivers. The responsibility for interpreting the message is left to the 
receiver, who has the autonomy to assign a meaning different from 
that intended by the sender. Peters suggested that the gap between 
encoding the message and the audience’s decoding of the message 
“may well be the mark of all forms of communication” (p. 52). The 
gaps only become obvious with the introduction of a new medium, 
such as the Internet, which produced outcomes far removed from 
those intended by its creators. 
Contrary to dialogue, the dissemination of the synoptic Gospels 
values asymmetric relationships and public distribution. The sender 
ignores individual differences or the possibility of reciprocity. One is 
expected to treat other people as one would want to be treated 
regardless of consequences or merit. The father receives the prodigal 
son with open arms and generosity despite the son’s moral and 
monetary transgressions. Distribution ignores merit and treats all 
receivers justly and without bias. “There is something both democratic 
and frightening about such apparent indifference to merit” (Peters, 
1999, p. 54). Furthermore, it is better to give than receive. Instead of 
imposing obligation, giving blesses the lives of the receivers for their 
“unprovoked generosity (one-way)” (p. 58). Reciprocity can rob people 
of individuality and uniqueness, taking away the qualities that form the 
basis of love. It also can be unjust because it can theoretically limit 
universal access to communication interactions and processes. 
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Clearly there is nothing ethically deficient about broadcasting as 
a one-way flow. Nor are the gaps between sender and receiver 
always chasms to be bridged; they are sometimes vistas to be 
appreciated or distances to be respected. The impossibility of 
connection, so lamented of late, may be a central and salutary 
feature of the human lot. The dream of communication has too 
little respect for personal inaccessibility. (Peters, 1999, p. 59) 
The final difference between Socrates and Christ may have the 
most profound implications for public relations. It also calls into 
question the very foundation of the argument for two-way symmetrical 
as being morally superior to one-way dissemination. Platonic love is 
attracted to beauty. It must be impersonal and general to qualify as 
love. Socrates sees no value in love of the particular. Christian love, on 
the other hand, embraces the differences of others, especially those 
with needs and imperfections. Indeed, one could argue that Christian 
love exalts diversity, seeing each person as unique and valuable, while 
Platonic love values the uniting of two souls into a universal oneness 
that marginalizes individuality. Peters (1999) argued that 
dissemination as a model for communication better represents the 
reality of the human agent, unique, different, and imperfect. 
“Dissemination is not wreckage; it is our lot” (p. 62). 
Dialogue’s disgust for the distinct presents public relations with 
an intriguing paradox. To fulfill Socrates’s expectations for dialogue, an 
organization would select only publics with which it could successfully 
communicate. Only those most likely to agree with the organization’s 
position would be worthy of love or of a relationship. If the two parties 
could not reach mutual understanding, the effort would be considered 
a fruitless waste of energy and love. Thus, for dialogue to truly occur, 
the organization would select like-minded publics, those judged most 
likely to reach an agreement with the organization. However, this 
focus on only those publics possessing the capability to reciprocate and 
accommodate to the organization’s position would directly conflict with 
the basic assumptions of open systems theory, which calls for 
adjusting and adapting to changes in the environment (Bivins, 1992). 
In other words, the demands of dialogue force the organization to 
become more strategic and selective in its communication and more 
reliant on homogenous publics to achieve mutual understanding. The 
use of selective communication designed to persuade like-minded 
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publics transforms dialogue into two-way asymmetric communication, 
which is based on controlling the environment rather than adjusting 
and adapting to it. In his critique of writing, Socrates complained that 
written words reach out to “those who understand as in the same way 
by those for whom it is in now way fitting….” Without support of the 
“father” of the words, written words cannot defend against fault-
finding and unfair attacks (Plato, 1998, p. 86 [p. 275d–e]; see also 
Peters, 1999, p. 47). In other words, the sender’s motivation for 
entering into dialogue is not necessarily to hear what the receiver has 
to say but to make sure the sender’s words reach the right people and 
are understood in the right way. 
In early 2005, President George Bush visited cities across the 
country promoting an overhaul of the social security system. In public 
meetings, he conversed with “ordinary” people, many of whom were 
“handpicked to dramatize his points, in front of crowds of supporters” 
(Kosterlitz, 2005, p. 854). At a town-hall style event in Florida, one of 
the “regular folks” said he liked the President’s plan to allow people to 
invest Social Security money in the stock market because it would 
produce higher returns. The President readily agreed with the man’s 
opinion because it was the same as his own. The man turned out to be 
an activist for a conservative group. At another event aimed at testing 
public opinion in New Jersey, White House staffers held a dress 
rehearsal for participants the day before the event. The Democrats 
also staged town-hall events feature their own activists as “regular 
folks” (Bailey, Wolffe, &Lipper, 2005,pp.34–35). These examples show 
how the burden of reaching understanding and consensus has 
ultimately led to inequity in the environment and exclusion from the 
dialogue. 
Dialogue and Systems Theory 
The use of systems theory as a foundation for public relations 
also becomes problematic from the ethical standpoint. Cutlip et al. 
(2000) defined a system as a set of interdependent units or parts that 
adjusts and adapts to external (and likely internal) pressures to 
maintain its goal states (existence). Public relations helps to maintain 
symmetry between the organization and its publics. With external 
pressures driving change and adaptation, dialogue’s bias toward 
relationships most likely to lead to agreement becomes even more 
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morally questionable in systems symmetry. In systems theory, 
stakeholders increase in importance to public relations because of their 
instrumental value to the organization rather than their intrinsic value 
as human beings. Bivins (1992) suggested that an organization or 
system weigh the interests of stakeholders based on their claims on 
the organization (p. 373). Only those stakeholders considered valuable 
to the organization’s success or possessing the most valid claims might 
be considered worthy of dialogue, and the dialogue is limited to the 
extent necessary to bring about agreement and adjustment. An 
organization could then justify the selective use of dialogue, the 
strategic selection of publics, and the strategic use communication to 
reach agreement. This could lead to the creation of a communication 
caste system for external publics and internal publics. Those 
employees seen as less instrumental to the success of the organization 
would then become less worthy of dialogic communication. Bivins 
(2004) has since modified his position, contending that organizations 
have the greatest moral obligation to those “linkages” or stakeholders 
most affected by organizational decisions, particularly those 
constituents most vulnerable to organizational actions. 
Where before ethical decisions were contingent on system 
inputs (Bivins, 1992, p. 375), now ethical decisions would emphasize 
system outputs. Individuals are valued as means to achieving 
corporation ends. Furthermore, the organization’s moral obligations 
arise from factors external to the organization rather than on the 
moral character of the system itself. The irony of ethical 
communication based on systems theory and dialogue is that its very 
emphasis on equality, consensus, and agreement could promote 
inequity in the selection of publics (even those considered most 
vulnerable), a false consensus arising from the selection criteria, and 
disparate treatment of publics based on their instrumental or even 
noninstrumental value to the organization. 
These ironies also are present the two-way symmetrical model. 
Grunig and Hunt (1984) contended that two-way symmetrical 
communication would make organizations more responsible to their 
publics. However, theoretically, the two-way symmetrical model 
reduces the responsibility of the organization and the public in 
determining right action. The very act of negotiating right relieves 
each party of some of its responsibility to be right. One’s morals 
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become fluid, flowing through channels offering the least resistance or 
the most opportunity. Symmetry means that an organization or public 
can shift part of the responsibility for determining right action to the 
other party. Thus, instead of increasing an organization’s burden for 
right action, symmetry may reduce expectations and encourage 
adapting for the sake of reaching an agreement acceptable to both 
parties. Cancel et al. (1999) noted that taking a moral stand on some 
issues may demand placing principle above process in communicating. 
They argued that practitioners shift between advocacy and 
accommodation depending upon a variety of variables, such as 
corporate culture, size of the organization, individual characteristics, 
and public relations access to the dominant coalition. However, this 
contingency approach, like symmetry, also smacks of ethical 
relativism. Instead of abdicating moral responsibility to reach an 
external agreement, the practitioner adjusts moral behaviors to fit 
external conditions or variables. One might make moral stands but 
only if the conditions call for them. 
Dialogue also requires equality among parties and the sharing of 
information. However, even the most sincere corporation might find it 
difficult to create a situation of equality in communicating with its 
various stakeholders. The corporation employs professional 
communicators valued for expertise far superior to that possessed by 
civic groups, smaller organizations, and even the government. Activist 
groups often lack the funding necessary to match wits with corporate 
public relations personnel. Equality also becomes a factor in 
considering the sharing of information. In theory, one would be 
completely open in dialogic relationships, reciprocating with each 
communicative action, and eventually having all information in 
common. However, most organizations have access to far greater 
resources in information and technology, giving them an advantage in 
the relationship. If the goal of the discourse is agreement, either party 
might hold back information that might discourage consensus or might 
use its resources to supply information that encourage consensus. The 
outcome would be a false consensus reached through covert deception 
or overt coercion. When the U.S. Department of Education paid 
syndicated columnist and TV personality Armstrong Williams to 
promote the No Child Left Behind Act, it used its financial resources to 
guarantee that Armstrong understood and agreed with the message. 
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He reciprocated by repeating the message as if it were his own opinion 
(Friel, 2005). Truth was negotiated, and symmetry was achieved. 
Dialogue also threatens to become a paternalistic approach to 
communication. The elite father serves as a mentor to a noble disciple 
carefully selected for his beauty and receptive spirit. An organization 
could selectively choose only those stakeholders who could reciprocate 
through an economic and emotional attachment. Dialogue could easily 
degenerate to a quid pro quo relationship with those whose gifts would 
best benefit the bottom line. This would mean entering into dialogue 
with people with the means to give something back. This type of 
relationship places a high priority on strategic selection, strategic 
communication, and strategic adaptation. Thus, the very antitheses of 
dialogue—persuasive and strategic communication—could become a 
natural outgrowth of the dialogic relationship. To resolve this conflict, 
a necessary step is to shift the moral emphasis of public relations from 
establishing relationships to adopting universal community principles 
(Arnett, 1986, p. 97). Common principles and values should precede 
and take precedence over relationships. 
These are admittedly extreme cases. Plenty of anecdotal 
evidence exists in the public relations literature to support the benefits 
of two-way symmetrical communication. While still advocating the 
two-way symmetrical model as the most effective for public relations, 
Grunig and Grunig (1992) noted calls for a continuum between two-
way asymmetrical and symmetrical communication and agreed that 
professional practice encompasses aspects of both models. However, 
they again questioned the moral validity of dissemination models of 
public relations, categorizing them under the umbrella of craft public 
relations. The problem with this kind of dichotomy is that it fails to 
consider the possibility of two parties reconciling their differences 
without resorting to persuasion or dialogue. Indeed, the gaps between 
two parties may serve as the foundation for professional relationships 
in which distance protects against personal and public deception. 
Take for instance, the proverbial relationship between public 
relations practitioners and journalists. Journalists often rely on public 
relations practitioners for newsworthy information and sources. Public 
relations practitioners count on journalists for media coverage and 
third party endorsements. The two have complementary but distinct 
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objectives. However, the recognition of these differences allows each 
party to determine its interdependence with the other without turning 
to manipulation. Ironically, the potential for manipulation (or 
corrupting media channels) increases in a dialogic relationship based 
on reciprocity and mutual benefit. Public relations practitioners would 
offer journalists first dibs on a big story in return for favorable 
treatment and good play on the story. At the other end of a continuum 
between dialogue and dissemination, journalists would make editorial 
decisions about a disseminated press release or pitch solely on the 
merits of its news content and value to the publication’s readers. 
In excluding dissent in favor of agreeable supporters, President 
Bush’s efforts to reform Social Security may have violated the 
differences, the gaps expected to exist between the government and 
the governed. A majority of the public may not have embraced his 
reforms because his campaign focused on managed agreement rather 
than reconciled differences. In contrast, dissemination allows for 
publics to decide how they want to manage their own relationships 
with the organization. Just because a company disseminates 
information without any framework or expectation of public response 
does not mean that the company will ignore responses. Absence of 
immediate feedback puts more responsibility on the organization to 
communicate accurately and effectively in the first place. Peters 
(1999) argued that a “receiver-oriented model in which the sender has 
no control over the harvest” (p. 35) demands that messages be as 
clear as possible so meaning is not lost in the interpretation. “It 
becomes the hearer’s responsibility to close the loop without the aid of 
the speaker” (Peters, 1999, p. 52). A company committed to character 
and community does not wait for a public response to correct 
inconsistencies in its communication and behavior. This does not mean 
that agreement and feedback are not important; it means that it 
should not be the ultimate concern. Of greater concern is one’s regard 
for self, the other person, and community. 
The act of becoming communities implies a process in which 
community members engage in an ongoing process of interpretation 
(Royce, 1988; Trotter, 2001), not necessarily dialogue. Community 
members can interpret public reaction because they share the values 
and loyalties of the community. One’s interpretations of those values 
and loyalties might be different, but having care and concern for 
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community members engenders empathy, an emotional 
understanding. Companies hire public relations people because they 
speak a different language than that normally spoken in the business 
community. Public relations people tend to be more in tune with the 
press and the public. They intuitively know when corporate behavior 
will spark negative or positive reactions in the court of public opinion. 
Their role is not so much to reach an agreement with the disparate 
publics but to act as an interpreter between the organization’s 
dominant coalition and the people affected by an organization. If the 
organization exploits or undermines the community by violating 
community values and norms, no amount of dialogue or two-way 
communication will bridge the chasm. 
Communities emerge from a combination of dialogue, 
dissemination, and interpretation. The goal of public relations is not to 
promote consensus in a community or even understanding. The goal of 
public relations is to identify the distinctive aspects of the community 
and understand and appreciate its community values that make it 
unique. Kruckeberg and Starck (1988) contended that the goal of 
community relations in public relations is to “restore and maintain a 
sense of community, which has been lost in contemporary society” (p. 
26). American idealist Josiah Royce (1908) attributed the loss of 
community to the leveling effect of industrialization. By leveling effect, 
Royce meant the loss of identity, either as individuals or as 
communities. In modern times, the leveling effect has resulted from 
the mainstreaming of culture through the mass media, mass 
marketing, and mass technologies. People have lost their sense of 
place, family, past, and future. Trotter (2001) explained that Royce’s 
communities consisted of common “memories and expectations,” and 
community members cooperate in seeking truth. “In the highest 
stages of moral life,” Trotter continued, “individuals develop, through 
empathy and other powers of social communication, a deeper moral 
insight and an ability to interpret the ideals of ever wider cross 
sections of humanity” (pp. 83–84). As members of a community, 
individuals interpret their own goals and ideals “in terms of an 
overarching loyalty to humanity” (p. 84). 
Royce’s community of inquiry views communication in much the 
same way as the philosopher G. W. F. Hegel, who, according to Peters 
(1999), saw communication not as shared information but “as the 
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process whereby a free human world is built collectively” (p. 110). 
According to Peters, Hegel would not have separated the message 
from the channel because communication is embodied in a person’s 
subjective interior and in external objects. One gains knowledge of the 
world as one comes to understand how particulars make up the whole. 
In other words, the building of communities and relationships is a 
product of reconciling the mutual recognition of others’ differences, not 
only in what they say but how they say it. Hegel (1948) said, “Life is 
the union of union and nonunion” (p. 312). “Hence ‘communication’ 
will always be more than the shuttling of mind-stuff. It is the founding 
of a world” (as cited in Peters, 1999, p. 112; see Hegel, 1948). It also 
is the stuff out of which relationships develop. Human existence 
depends on the recognition of another human being. Public relations 
recognizes that activist groups may disagree, employees may not feel 
secure in their jobs, neighbors may not want a new plant in their 
backyard, and customers may need reassurance that one’s products 
are safe. By embracing diversity in opinion, public relations actually 
becomes a more human enterprise. “Recognition enables humanity. 
Self-consciousness exists only as it is recognized” (as cited in Peters, 
1999, p. 115; see Hegel, 1977). 
Recognition involves interpretation. Communication becomes 
the process of interpreting one’s world and then reconciling the 
subjective recognitions with objective meanings and visa versa. Thus, 
meanings are both private and public phenomena The communication 
intended by a public relations practitioner may only be partially 
recognized in a news story written by a journalist. The practitioner 
cannot physically express his or her intentions to the reader, but the 
reader sees hints of the practitioner’s intentions in the media story. 
The multiplicity of interactions between an organization and its 
stakeholders makes it impossible to control all possible interpretations 
and outcomes. Peters (1999) contended that this interaction is a 
model of communication in general. “To live is to leave traces. To 
speak to another is to produce signs that are independent of one’s soul 
and are interpreted without one’s control” (p. 118). 
Thus, an organization’s relationships with its publics are not 
understood through the fusing of one person with another (such as 
management and stakeholders) but through the establishing of 
“conditions under which the mutual recognition of self-conscious 
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individuals is possible” (p. 112). This kind of recognition occurs when 
the local bank sponsors an evening budgeting class for newlyweds, a 
bike manufacturer trains a local Boy Scout troop to assemble and 
service their own bikes, and a newspaper sponsors the community 
spelling bee. 
Recognition Leads to Reconciliation 
In a sense, people must overcome differences while at the same 
time appreciating the differences in others. Society emerges and 
changes from this recognition and reconciliation. It is also possible that 
this is at the heart of relationships. The public relations practitioner 
recognizes the individuality of a particular public and then reconciles, 
not eliminates, those differences in building a relationship. Journalists 
may never feel comfortable about working with a public relations 
practitioners, but the recognition of their differences leads to the 
reconciliation necessary for them to accomplish their disparate goals. 
Communication breakdowns are as likely to reveal truth as they 
are to suppress it. For public relations this means more might be 
learned about a situation by focusing on the problems inhibiting 
communication rather than on the express goal of the communication. 
All out efforts to reach agreement may lead both parties to suppress 
differences rather than recognizing them and reconciling them. This 
process exposes a paradox in dialogic communication. The very goal of 
agreement and consensus may well cause the parties to overlook and 
suppress issues critical to any kind of long-term agreement or 
reconciliation. To reach agreement, the two parties might minimize 
differences that smolder in the background until circumstances or 
social conditions push them to the forefront, forcing the parties back to 
the negotiating table to find another artificial agreement to mask the 
underlying non-agreement. 
Kierkegaard saw communication as “strategic 
misunderstanding” (Peters, 1999, p. 129). The responsibility for 
interpreting the communication is left to the hearers. The message is 
cloaked in irony; it cannot be separated from the mode of 
communication. In his writings, Kierkegaard “employed indirect 
communication … in order to take himself as author out of the picture 
and to leave the reader alone with the ideas” (Hong & Hong, 1983, p. 
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x). As with Jesus’s parables, Kierkegaard’s idea of communication is to 
pass along messages not readily apparent to everyone but blatantly 
obvious to those in the know. In an age of technology, distance, and 
speed, dialogue’s ideal mode of communication, face-to-face, is a rare 
commodity, and the hearer’s ability to test Habermas’s (1996) validity 
claims—truth, rightness, and truthfulness—is nearly impossible (p. 
137). Communication is difficult, and failure to achieve understanding 
or agreement does not mean that communication did not take place. 
Indeed, problems in communication may tell more about individuals 
and others than the absence of a communication breakdown. In 
relations with others, the particular takes precedence over the general. 
Others are valued for their uniqueness, their differences. As we begin 
to reconcile those differences, we develop relationships based on love 
of the individual and individuality not the possibility of cloning that 
person into a common mindset. The emphasis is not on making the 
person a part of a crowd but identifying the persons in the crowd as 
individuals pursuing a variety of goals and ideals. The purpose of 
communication then becomes an effort to not only learn more about 
others but to gain a greater understanding of who we are. 
Organizations, like other community members, should cherish the 
chance to distinguish differences because those very differences clarify 
our mission and principles to internal and external audiences. As Mill 
(1863/2002) wrote, “He who knows only his side of the case, knows 
little of that” (p. 38). Mill contended that hearing another’s arguments 
through intermediaries is not sufficient. One must hear from the 
people possessing those arguments and willing to passionately defend 
them. Unless placed into “the mental position of those who think 
differently,” people “cannot know themselves the doctrine which they 
themselves profess” (p. 38). Public relations becomes the corporate 
conscience, not because they know the organization better than 
anybody else, but because they know better than anybody else in the 
organization what outsiders think. 
Thus the goal of public relations changes from finding 
agreement to discovering differences. As differences become 
transparent, even those differences between who we think we are and 
who others perceive us to be, they can be reconciled in a way that 
places a high value on our common humanity. Using this framework, 
we engage people or publics in communication, not in an effort to 
change them or even to change us, but because as human beings, we 
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value our relationships with other human beings. The outcome of this 
type of relationship is a different kind of change, one not of adaptation 
or adjustment in response to outside pressures, but constitutional 
change in who we are and how we perceive ourselves—which then 
leads to changes in the way we interact and communicate. Our 
external publics are empowered to change themselves based on 
internal values and loyalties rather than outside coercion or obligatory 
reciprocity. 
This new approach to public relations emphasizes reconciliation 
through dissemination and engagement. The goal of communication is 
to achieve authenticity or what Kierkegaard calls a “persistent striving” 
for truth, a striving to become a person who acts without deception 
(Kierkegaard, 1971, p. 110, 119–122). The authentic person sacrifices 
his or her will to universal moral laws while “constantly striving” to 
fulfill moral ideals (Copleston, 1985, p. 348; see also Kierkegaard, 
1971). The authentic organization would not settle for an artificial 
agreement or a balance between opposing opinions, but seek to find 
the truth in opposition and agreement. If the organization harbors 
more error than truth, it will feel obligated to rewrite its moral 
constitution. Change is internally motivated. Public relations will value 
diversity, uniqueness, and pluralism. It will look at stakeholders as 
individual human beings, not inhuman publics. It will value equity in 
action and purpose over maintaining the equilibrium of the system. 
Organizations will achieve authority through their appeal to universal 
values and loyalties. 
Harvard philosopher Carl Friedrich (1963) provided a model for 
this new type of public relations in his description of a constitutional 
order. The order consists of people with common interests and beliefs 
founded on basic universal principles. The common people have 
freedom to act and think for themselves, but their commitment to 
basic principles ties them together in the common interests of the 
order. Dissent, or might one say difference, is essential because the 
“continuous struggle in the marketplace of ideas” helps to maintain the 
authority of the order or organization. It is critical for the organization 
to continually engage its members through communication. As 
organizational members participate in this discourse, they begin to 
look upon these communications as their own, “as something they 
have taken hold of as much as it has taken hold of them” (pp. 53–54). 
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As the two parties exchange communication, the organization 
uses its authority to augment and implement the actions of the 
stakeholders affected by that authority. As these stakeholders begin to 
see the organization as a partner in achieving their own goals as well 
as community goals, they become engaged. They do not reach a 
consensus on plans of action so much as they participate in a common 
cause based on universal principles or those principles to which all 
people might be loyal (see Royce, 1908). They then develop a loyalty 
of a different type, one based on common values, not reciprocation. 
Communication breakdowns are valued because they expose 
differences in how the parties interpret these values. Ultimately, 
relationships are based on internalized commonalities rather than 
externalized expectations and agreement. 
Corporations also are tenants of the people. They receive special 
privileges in society by virtue of legislation approved by bodies elected 
by the very people on whom the organizations depend for their 
survival. Corporations should encourage discussion and debate 
because they recognize, as every other human endeavor recognizes, 
that they are not infallible. Like individuals, organizations are “capable 
of rectifying mistakes, by discussion and experience” (Mill, 2002, p. 
22). Corporations do not communicate with various groups to achieve 
agreement. They communicate because they have something worth 
saying, and they recognize that supporters and dissidents have 
something worth saying, even if it is easily exposed as error. In other 
words, organizations are open to opposing ideas because they are part 
of a community of inquiry and care about other members of that 
community. The organization’s purpose is finding truth, not achieving 
what may be an artificial agreement. 
It would be wrong to say that agreement is not desirable, but a 
more realistic approach would be to seek agreement on general 
principles. This allows for reasonable discussion and discourse between 
disparate parties. John Rawls (1993) saw this ability to recognize the 
value of differences among perceptions while sharing common beliefs 
about justice in a free society as reasonable pluralism. “Once we 
accept the fact that reasonable pluralism is a permanent condition of 
public culture under free institutions, the idea of the reasonable is 
more suitable as part of the basis of public justification” (Rawls, 1993, 
p. 129, as cited in McCarthy, 1994, p. 60). Without a recognition of 
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reasonable pluralism and a willingness to have one’s ideas widely 
dispersed, powerful organizations may begin to “impose their beliefs 
because, they say, their beliefs are true, and not because they are 
their beliefs” (Rawls, 1993, p. 61; see also McCarthy, 1994, p. 60). 
When people make the claim of truth based on their own beliefs and 
then try to impose those beliefs on others, people are viewed as 
unreasonable by an open society. Thus, reasonable citizens do not 
impose their will on others but reconcile their beliefs with those of 
others. 
Organizations do not necessarily need to use symmetrical 
communication to achieve a relationship with their stakeholders. They 
recognize a plurality of beliefs and disseminate information as to their 
beliefs, recognizing that others, even a minority, may differ. “If the 
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging 
error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, 
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its 
collision with error,” wrote Mill (2002, p. 19). With a greater focus on 
identifying differences, public relations acts to reconcile disparate 
opinions and facilitate the discovery of truth inside and outside the 
organization. Suppressing an opposing opinion that contains truth may 
cause the organization to hold opinions laced with prejudice and error 
that lead it further and further away from the truth. Ultimately the 
time will come in which “favorable circumstances” (p. 30) allow for the 
truth to be known, and the people, “whose whole mental development 
is cramped,” react with anger against the source of their deception 
(pp. 34–35). Public relations should focus more on organizational 
character and the discovery and dissemination of truth than it does on 
dialogue. The field will find that by giving up some control over the 
conversation, it will gain a greater voice in the conversation. The 
public will begin to see practitioners as partners in the search for truth, 
not as parents meddling in the meanings of their message offspring. 
Conclusions 
In this article, we show that public relations’ infatuation with 
dialogue may create unrealistic expectations for organizational and 
individual communication. Indeed, adherence to dialogic approaches, 
such as the twoway symmetrical model, though well intended, may 
actually cause public relations to slip into simple quid pro quo 
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relationships. Peters’s (1999) analysis of communication approaches 
advocated by Socrates and Jesus exposed the flaws of looking at two-
way communication as most ethical and dissemination as the most 
unethical. Dissemination can be just and dialogue unjust. More 
important than the mode of communication is the morality of 
communicators and their willingness to recognize and reconcile 
differences. Finding truth becomes much more important than 
achieving agreement, and change is motivated by a commitment to 
character rather than a desire to manage reputation and consensus. 
The goals of symmetrical communication or dialogic 
communication are commendable but unreasonable. The common 
ground sought by competing parties is not as important as the 
common principles of truth, freedom, liberty, and human rights that 
both espouse. Organizations should engage in communication because 
they recognize the sovereignty of the individual, value liberty, and 
seek truth. They disseminate ideas as a matter of conscience and 
listen to public response as a matter of principle. 
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